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What Have I Opted Myself Into? 
Resolving the Uncertain Status of Opt-In 
Plaintiffs Prior to Conditional Certification in 
Fair Labor Standards Act Litigation 
Carl Engstrom*  
On March 1, 2005, loan officer Christopher Chemi filed a 
collective action against Champion Mortgage alleging that their 
policy of classifying loan officers as exempt from receiving over-
time pay violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).1 Three 
months later, Chemi moved to conditionally certify the collec-
tive action, a move which would have led the court to send no-
tice of the suit to other potential plaintiffs and subsequently al-
low those plaintiffs to opt into the suit by submitting a consent 
form to the court.2 In the year it took for the court to decide this 
motion, plaintiffs’ counsel established a website to publicize the 
suit, and 112 current and former loan officers at Champion 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
would like to thank Michelle Drake, who acted as both a mentor and trusted 
friend throughout the process of writing this Note, much as she has for the 
past twenty years. Thanks to Professors Daniel Schwarcz and William 
McGeveran for their valuable advice and guidance. Thanks to the staff and 
editors of Minnesota Law Review for their many contributions to this Note, 
and for generally putting up with the author for the past two years. Complete 
and total love to Ellen Engstrom and Anna Engstrom, the two best people in 
the history of the universe, and to Dr. Fritz Engstrom, who is also pretty 
great. This Note could never have been written without the loyalty and friend-
ship of Matthew Johnson, Joshua Barr, and Jesse Tremaine. Copyright © 2012 
by Carl Engstrom. 
 1. Letter Order at 2, Chemi v. Champion Mortg., No. 05-cv-1238 (D.N.J. 
June 19, 2006), ECF No. 72. “Collective action” is the term used to describe 
representative suits brought under the FLSA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(2006). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1807 (3d ed. 2005).  
 2. Letter Order, supra note 1, at 2, 15–16; Memorandum of Law in Op-
position to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class as Collective Action and in Sup-
port of Cross-Motion to Strike Opt-in Forms at 1, Chemi, No. 05-cv-1238, 2005 
WL 2099222 (D.N.J. July 29, 2005), ECF No. 37-1. 
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Mortgage filed consent forms to join the suit.3 The court struck 
all 112 plaintiffs who had opted into the suit, stating that 
plaintiffs’ counsel should not have solicited potential plaintiffs 
before conditional certification was granted and a court-
authorized notice of the suit had been sent to these plaintiffs.4 
On November 25, 2003, Chad Wombles filed a complaint 
against Title Max of Alabama alleging that managers and as-
sistant managers had been forced to work over seventy hours 
per week without being paid overtime wages in violation of the 
FLSA.5 Despite the fact that Wombles was one of seven manag-
ers who had already filed consent forms, the court denied con-
ditional certification because “the plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate that there are other employees who desire to opt 
in to this action.”6 The contradiction is obvious: had plaintiffs’ 
counsel more aggressively solicited potential plaintiffs, the col-
lective action may have been certified; yet the act of solicitation 
itself may have led the court to strike the opt-in plaintiffs, as 
the court did in Chemi v. Champion Mortgage.7 
These two cases are by no means unique. FLSA case law is 
wildly inconsistent on a number of procedural questions involv-
ing precertification opt-in plaintiffs (PreCOIs)8 in collective ac-
tions under the FLSA. This confusion is largely attributable to 
the fact that the existence of PreCOIs is not statutorily con-
templated. Section 216(b) of the FLSA allows actions to be 
brought “[o]n behalf of . . . other employees similarly situated” 
who consent to joining the suit.9 But the statute fails to define 
who is “similarly situated,” specify how that determination is 
 
 3. Letter Order, supra note 1, at 3, 17. 
 4. Id. at 18. 
 5. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3–4, Wombles v. Title Max of 
Ala., Inc., No. 3:03-cv-01158CWO (M.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 2003), ECF No. 1 (stat-
ing that defendants had a policy of requiring employees “to work 60–80 hours 
per week for a salaried amount”); see also Wombles, No. 3:03-cv-01158CWO, 
2005 WL 3312670, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2005) (“The plaintiffs al-
lege . . . [they] worked between 70–75 hours per week.”). 
 6. Wombles, 2005 WL 3312670, at *3. 
 7. Id.; Letter Order, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 8. The term PreCOI, as used in this Note, refers to individuals who are 
not named plaintiffs (i.e., named as plaintiffs in the original complaint), but 
who have filed consent forms to join the FLSA collective action after the com-
plaint has been filed but before the court has granted conditional certification 
(or any other dispositive motions). See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1 (describing 
the filing of the complaint and subsequent conditional certification process in 
an FLSA collective action). 
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
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made, or state whether such a determination is necessary for 
employees to become parties to the action.10 
To fill in the first two of these three gaps in the statute, 
federal courts have developed a two-stage certification process 
to determine whether the employees are similarly situated.11 At 
the first stage, known as conditional certification, if the court 
makes a preliminary determination that the complaint has suc-
cessfully defined a group of similarly situated employees, notice 
of the suit is sent to this class of employees, and they may join 
the action by returning a signed consent form to the court.12 For 
the sake of clarity, once conditional certification has been 
granted, the group of opt-in plaintiffs will be referred to in this 
Note as post-certification opt-ins (PostCOIs).13 
While the certification process helps to determine whether 
employees are similarly situated, it does not address the ques-
tion of whether employees who want to join the suit have to 
wait for conditional certification before they may join the suit. 
In other words, if the statute requires opt-in plaintiffs to be 
similarly situated, does the court need to certify this before 
employees may join the suit? And if plaintiffs may join the suit 
prior to this determination, what is their status? This Note 
seeks to answer these questions through an interpretation of 
existing statutory language.  
Ideally, the conditional certification stage would occur very 
early in the case, making the problems posed by PreCOIs large-
ly irrelevant. While this is sometimes the case, it is becoming 
increasingly common for cases to take a year or more before 
conditional certification is granted.14 This may happen for a 
 
 10. See id.; see also James M. Fraser, Opt-In Class Actions Under the 
FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 96 n.5, 111 (2004) (noting that the statute neither de-
fines the term “similarly situated” nor outlines how courts should determine 
whether plaintiffs are similarly situated). 
 11. See Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218–19 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (outlining the two-stage process and recommending that federal dis-
trict courts adopt it as a matter of practice); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 12. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 13. The group known as PostCOIs includes both parties who were former-
ly PreCOIs as well as parties that submit their consent forms after receiving 
court-authorized notice of the suit. See id. 
 14. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1243 
(11th Cir. 2008) (granting conditional certification twenty-two months after 
the complaint was filed); Lopez v. Tyson Foods, No. 8:06CV459, 2008 WL 
3485289, at *1, *4 (D. Neb. Aug. 7, 2008) (granting conditional certification 
over two years after the complaint was filed); Toure v. Cent. Parking Sys., No. 
05 Civ. 5237 (WHP), 2007 WL 2872455, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007) (same). 
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number of reasons, one of which is the need to resolve proce-
dural questions revolving directly or indirectly around the sta-
tus of PreCOIs: whether PreCOIs may join the suit before certi-
fication, whether plaintiffs’ counsel can solicit PreCOIs and to 
what extent, and whether PreCOIs can be compelled to partici-
pate in discovery.15 
These procedural questions have a number of important 
implications. The statute of limitations for FLSA claims is only 
two years,16 and does not toll for an individual plaintiff until 
she files a consent form with the court to join the suit.17 Given 
that “a claim for unpaid overtime under the FLSA accrues at 
the end of each pay period when it is not paid,” limiting em-
ployees’ ability to join a suit before it is conditionally certified 
may severely limit employees’ ability to obtain relief under the 
FLSA, as an employee can only recover lost wages for the two 
years preceding the date on which the employee joins the suit.18 
Procedural rules that differ between circuits may lead to une-
ven enforcement of the statute, especially where certain cir-
cuits’ rules are more plaintiff-friendly.19 Finally, these proce-
dural issues may implicate judicial economy if PreCOIs are 
required to participate in discovery,20 if plaintiffs must amend 
 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006). The statute of limitations is three years 
where the employer’s FLSA violations are found to be willful. Id. 
 17. Id. §§ 255–56.  
 18. Cook v. United States, 855 F.2d 848, 851 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 
Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence 
of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1317, 1330 (2008) (arguing that requiring employees to wait until the collec-
tive action is conditionally certified to join the suit “often significantly reduces 
the back pay ultimately awarded to opt-in plaintiffs”). 
 19. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequence of Congress’s Choice of Del-
egate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 
428–29 (2010) (arguing that inconsistent standards of employer liability for 
supervisor sexual harassment was responsible for “substantial geographic 
disuniformity” in the enforcement of Title VII); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred 
Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Re-
sources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 
(1987) (arguing that diverse circuit applications of vague statutory language 
impedes “uniform national administration of the laws”). 
 20. See Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Proce-
dural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 727, 737–38 (2008) (describing recent increase in FLSA filings and 
courts’ motivation to stem the tide of litigation); see also infra Part II.A.3. 
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their complaint for PreCOIs to join the suit,21 or if procedural 
uncertainty makes disputes between the parties more likely.22 
This Note argues that minimizing this procedural incon-
sistency requires defining the status of PreCOIs in terms of 
whether employees may opt into collective actions before condi-
tional certification and what their status is should they do so. 
This Note fills this gap by forwarding an interpretation of the 
statute that both defines the status of PreCOIs while providing 
a framework to address procedural questions that arise prior to 
conditional certification.  
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the collective ac-
tion mechanism and the development of the two-stage certifica-
tion process. Part II outlines the areas of procedural uncertain-
ty at early stages of FLSA litigation related to the uncertain 
status of PreCOIs, then introduces three possible interpreta-
tions of the statute to address this uncertainty. Part III evalu-
ates each interpretation, concluding that courts should adopt 
an interpretation under which potential plaintiffs may join the 
suit as provisional plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, 
yet are not considered similarly situated, and thus not parties 
to the suit, until the court grants conditional certification. 
I.  FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION MECHANISM AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO-STAGE CERTIFICATION 
PROCESS   
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 and established national 
minimum wage and overtime pay standards.23 Under the origi-
nal Act, class actions could be brought using the “spurious class 
action” mechanism available under Rule 23.24 Judgments in 
spurious class actions included all parties who had intervened 
before a trial on the merits.25  
 
 21. See Whalen v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 380, 387 (2009) (noting that 
allowing notice “benefits the judicial system by promoting efficient resolution 
of common issues if law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory 
activity”); see also infra Part II.A.1. 
 22. See Nicki Herbert, Note, Appellate Review of a “Strong Basis in Evi-
dence” in Public Contracting Cases, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 206 (2006). 
 23. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006)). 
 24. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-
to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 168 & n.659 (1991). 
 25. Id. at 168. 
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Congress overhauled the FLSA’s class action mechanism 
by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947.26 Congress had four 
primary objectives in making this change. First, Congress 
sought to prohibit union representatives from bringing suits on 
behalf of unionized workers.27 Second, Congress wanted to elim-
inate opt-out class actions by requiring that all plaintiffs con-
sent before joining the suit.28 Third, Congress sought to require 
employees to join the action early in the litigation, unlike the 
spurious class action device, to provide notice to employers of 
the number and size of claims against them.29 Finally, they 
wanted opt-in plaintiffs to be bound if they were in a position to 
benefit from the outcome in the suit.30  
Two sections of the Portal-to-Portal Act form the procedur-
al framework for the collective action mechanism. Section 
216(b) reads:  
An action to recover . . . may be maintained against any employ-
er . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 
themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall 
be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in 
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court 
in which such action is brought.31 
Section 256 describes when an action is considered to have 
been commenced for the purpose of calculating the statute of 
limitations period (listed in § 255). Section 256 reads:  
In determining when an action is commenced for the purposes of sec-
tion 255 of this title, an action . . . shall be considered to be com-
 
 26. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, § 5, 61 Stat. 87 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 
 27. See id. ch. 52, § 5(a) (amending the FLSA by eliminating the grant of 
authority to file representative actions); Linder, supra note 24, at 172; Note, 
Fair Labor Standards Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 352, 
360 (1948). 
 28. See 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell, Senate 
floor leader) (“Certainly there is no injustice in that, for if a man wants to join 
in the suit, why should he not give his consent, in writing?”); Linder, supra 
note 24, at 168, 173 (explaining the “spurious class action” mechanism in place 
before § 216(b) was passed, then arguing that “the entire line of argument” 
contained in the legislative debate “makes sense only if interpreted as moti-
vated by a general animus against what in 1966 became Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions”). 
 29. At the Senate debate over the Portal-to-Portal Act, Senator Donnell 
objected to the “spurious class action” whereby it would “be possible for 10,000 
men to wait 3 years [before joining the suit], with the employers not knowing 
how many thousands of dollars or millions of dollars . . . of claims will be as-
serted against them.” 93 CONG. REC. 2182. 
 30. Linder, supra note 24, at 169, 173. 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). 
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menced on the date when the complaint is filed; except that in the 
case of a collective or class action instituted under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, . . . it shall be considered to be commenced in 
the case of any individual claimant— 
(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named 
as a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to be-
come a party plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in which the 
action is brought; or 
(b) if such written consent was not so filed or if his name did not so 
appear—on the subsequent date on which such written consent is filed 
in the court in which the action was commenced.32 
This statutory language differs from Rule 23 in several 
ways.33 First, Rule 23 putative class members become plaintiffs 
once the class is certified unless they opt out, whereas potential 
plaintiffs must opt into an FLSA collective action by filing a 
consent form.34 Second, under Rule 23, the claims of all class 
members are tolled for statute-of-limitations purposes from the 
date the suit was filed,35 while an FLSA plaintiff ’s claims are 
not tolled until the plaintiff ’s consent form is filed with the 
court.36 Third, while Rule 23 lays out specific criteria that must 
be met to certify a class action,37 the FLSA requires plaintiffs to 
be “similarly situated,” but does not define the term.38 
These differences create two procedural challenges unique 
to the FLSA. First, all potential plaintiffs must be notified of 
the suit, and their consent forms must be processed.39 If the 
court leaves this to the parties, employees might join the suit 
based on misleading information that may prejudice the de-
fense or compromise the rights of employees who are misled in-
to opting in.40 However, court involvement in this process 
 
 32. Id. § 256 (emphasis added). 
 33. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and 29 U.S.C. § 256, with FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)–(2); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 35. See Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (holding 
that the commencement of a class action suspends the statute of limitations 
for all putative class members, and offering the rationale that this rule would 
prevent putative class members from filing duplicative suits to toll the statute).  
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 256(b). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring that the class be numerous, have 
common questions of law or fact, common defenses, and the ability of the 
named plaintiffs to represent the class). 
 38. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Brian R. Gates, Note, A “Less Stringent” 
Standard? How to Give FLSA Section 16(b) a Life of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2005) (“The congressional record . . . is completely silent as 
to any definition of the ‘similarly situated’ standard.”). 
 39. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 40. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–72 (1989); 
Woods v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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changes the court’s historically passive role in litigation while 
potentially compromising its impartiality by sending the mes-
sage that the court endorses the merits of the suit.41 
The second challenge that courts face is defining the term 
“similarly situated” and developing a procedure to make that 
determination.42 While “federal courts have had almost seventy 
years to become familiar with section 16(b) and its ‘similarly 
situated’ standard,”43 courts continue to struggle not only with 
how to define the term, but also whether it creates a stricter or 
more lenient standard for initiating a representative action 
than Rule 23.44 Legislative guidance is similarly absent regard-
ing procedural rules for certifying a collective action.45  
To address these two problems, a two-step certification 
process has evolved through case law.46 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling laid the founda-
tion for this process by authorizing court involvement in send-
ing notice to potential plaintiffs as a case management tool, 
holding that Section 216(b) grants courts “the requisite proce-
dural authority” to promulgate procedural rules so long as they 
are “not otherwise contrary to statutory commands.”47 The two-
step certification process was first articulated in Lusardi v. 
 
 41. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 180–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42. See Gates, supra note 38. 
 43. Id. at 1564. 
 44. See Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 
1058 (D. Colo. 1996) (describing four different approaches to defining “similar-
ly situated”); see also Gambrell v. Weber Carpet, Inc., No. 10-2131-KHV, 2010 
WL 4226153, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 2010) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has approved 
an ad hoc approach by which the Court determines on a case-by-case basis 
whether the members of the putative class are similarly situated.”). 
 45. See Gates, supra note 38 (“‘Congress did not explicitly attempt to spell 
out the metes and bounds intended for [FLSA] representative actions nor did 
it suggest procedures to be followed’ in the . . . representative actions author-
ized in section 16(b).” (quoting G. W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction, Rights, and 
Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Fed-
eral Questions, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 295, 324)); see also Prescott v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 2d 357, 363 (D. Me. 2010) (“The FLSA does not define 
‘similarly situated’ or prescribe a method for certifying a collective action.”). 
 46. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 47. Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 172 (1989). 
Hoffmann-LaRoche pertained to a collective action brought under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA). As part of the original statute enact-
ed in 1967, the ADEA incorporated § 216(b) of the FLSA, and thus each stat-
ute relies upon the same statutory language for its collective action 
mechanism. Id. at 165. As a result, ADEA and FLSA case law regarding the 
collective action mechanism is used interchangeably. Myers v. Hertz Corp., 
624 F.3d 537, 554 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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Xerox Corp., two years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hoffmann-La Roche,48 but was not endorsed by a circuit court 
until the Fifth Circuit did so in 1995.49 While district courts 
have discretion as to whether or not to use the procedure,50 the 
practice has become the norm.51 
At stage one, the notice or conditional certification stage, a 
lenient standard is applied to determine if the proposed collec-
tive is similarly situated.52 If this standard is met, the collective 
is conditionally certified, and notice of the action is sent to po-
 
 48. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987). 
 49. Mooney v. Aramco, 54 F.3d 1207, 1218–19 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 
(2003). 
 50. Davis v. Westgate Planet Hollywood Las Vegas, LLC, No. 2:08-cv-
00722-RCJ-PAL, 2009 WL 5038508, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2009) (“The Su-
preme Court has made it clear that while the district court has the discretion 
to conditionally certify a collective action under the FLSA, conditional certifi-
cation is not mandatory.”). 
 51. See Encinas v. J.J. Drywall Corp., 265 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
Whalen v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 380, 383 (2009); Sandoz v. Cingular 
Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 915 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008) (referring to the two-step 
approach as the typical manner in which collective actions proceed); Morgan v. 
Family Tree Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (advocating the 
use of the two-stage certification process by Eleventh Circuit courts); Thiessen 
v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (explicitly 
endorsing the two-stage certification process for use by Tenth Circuit courts); 
Johnson v. VCG Holding Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d 227, 233 (D. Me. 2011) (“The 
general practice of district courts within the First Circuit . . . has been to adopt 
a ‘two-tiered’ approach to certification of collective actions under the FLSA.”); 
Blaney v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:10-CV-592-FDW-DSC, 
2011 WL 4351631, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2011) (showing that Fourth Cir-
cuit district courts adopt the two-step certification process); Bollinger v. Resi-
dential Capital, LLC, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (“Within 
the Ninth Circuit, district courts have adopted the two-tiered . . . approach.”); 
Spicer v. Pier Sixty LLC, 269 F.R.D. 321, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Second Circuit); 
Lugo v. Farmer’s Pride Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 291, 299 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Third 
Circuit); Smallwood v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 710 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (Seventh Circuit); Noble v. Serco, Inc., No. 3:08-76-DCR, 2009 WL 
3154252, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2009) (Sixth Circuit); Resendiz-Ramirez v. 
P&H Forestry, LLC, 515 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (W.D. Ark. 2007) (Eighth Cir-
cuit). The only instance in which courts deviate from this norm is when exten-
sive discovery has already taken place, and the district court proceeds directly 
to the second stage of the certification process. See, e.g., Smith v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., No. CV 05-5274 ABC (SSx), 2007 WL 2385131, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
15, 2007); Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2006 
WL 2819730, at *7 n.7, *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006); Ray v. Motel 6 Oper-
ating, L.P., No. 3-95-828, 1996 WL 938231, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 1996). 
 52. See, e.g., Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1212–13.  
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tential plaintiffs, who must return a consent form included 
with the notice.53 
At the second stage, after discovery is complete or nearly 
complete, defendants move for decertification, and a much more 
stringent standard is applied.54 If the motion is denied, the ac-
tion proceeds as a collective action; if granted, the claims of the 
opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice, and they may 
proceed with their cases on an individual basis.55 While the cer-
tification process has helped to address certain procedural is-
sues left unresolved by § 216(b), significant procedural uncer-
tainty remains at early stages of a collective action. 
II.  PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNCERTAIN 
STATUS OF PRECOIS AND POTENTIAL STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATIONS TO RESOLVE THIS UNCERTAINTY   
This Part will begin by looking at the uncertain status of 
PreCOIs under the FLSA and how that uncertainty manifests 
itself in several specific contexts. Having identified the need for 
a defined status of PreCOIs, this Part will then analyze the rel-
evant statutory language and suggest three possible interpreta-
tions that provide this definition. 
A. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF PRECOIS RESULTS IN SEVERAL 
PROCEDURAL INCONSISTENCIES 
While § 216(b) sets out the requirements for becoming a 
“party plaintiff,” it does not specify when that occurs.56 While 
the statute requires additional plaintiffs to be similarly situat-
ed and to submit a written consent form to the court to join the 
suit, the statute does not specify whether party plaintiff  status 
is conferred upon the filing of consent, or a judicial determina-
tion that the potential plaintiff is similarly situated to the 
named plaintiff(s).57 The conditional certification process makes 
this problem particularly acute by creating a formal mecha-
nism to determine whether plaintiffs are similarly situated.58 
 
 53. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 54. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261–62; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 55. See Gayle v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 72, 77–78 (2008). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).  
 57. Id. 
 58. Cf. O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enter., 575 F.3d 567, 583 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“The district court followed a two-stage certification process, as many courts 
do, to determine whether the opt-in plaintiffs and lead plaintiffs were similar-
ly situated.”). 
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Some courts have read the statute as conferring party plaintiff  
status once written consent has been filed with the court, while 
others have argued that conditional certification confers this 
status.59 This uncertain status of PreCOIs creates a number of 
procedural problems. 
1. When PreCOIs May Join the Suit 
While most courts generally allow opt-in plaintiffs to join 
the suit at any time after the suit has commenced,60 some do 
not allow opt-in plaintiffs to join the suit before conditional cer-
tification has been granted.61 In Whalen v. United States, the 
Federal Claims Court held that filing notice was not enough for 
PreCOIs to join the action. “[S]imilarly situated employees who 
file consents to join an action brought under the FLSA should 
be added as party plaintiffs to the action by means of an 
amended complaint.”62 Along similar lines, other courts have 
argued in dicta that conditional certification should act as a 
prerequisite for opt-ins to join the suit.63 The potential problems 
 
 59. Compare Barefield v. Rob Noojin Roofing, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1610-T-
27TBM, 2009 WL 51278, at *5 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2009) (holding that condi-
tional certification was not necessary to make plaintiff ’s consent form active, 
because “he was a party plaintiff upon the filing of his consent-to-join”), and 
Kaiser v. At The Beach, No. 08-CV-586-TCK—FHM, 2009 WL 4506152, at *6 
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 24, 2009) (filing of consent forms conferred party plaintiff 
status upon opt-in plaintiffs prior to certification), with Morgan v. Family Dol-
lar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he importance of 
certification, at the initial stage, is that it authorizes either the parties, or the 
court itself, to facilitate notice of the action to similarly situated employees. 
After being given notice, putative class members have the opportunity to opt-
in.”), and Pereira v. Foot Locker, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 60, 62 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“Pur-
suant to the FLSA, there are two requirements for potential plaintiffs to be 
included in the collective action: plaintiffs must (1) be ‘similarly situated’ and 
(2) give written consent.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(observing that § 216(b) does not restrict plaintiffs “from opting in to the ac-
tion by filing consents with the district court, even when the notice described 
in Hoffmann-La Roche has not been sent”); Riojas v. Seal Produce, Inc., 82 
F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (“To become a party plaintiff under § 216(b), 
an individual need only consent in writing and have that consent filed in 
Court. There is no further need to comply with any requirements of a class ac-
tion which might be necessary under Rule 23.” (emphasis added)). 
 61. See, e.g., Melendez Cintron v. Hershey P.R., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 10, 
17 (D.P.R. 2005) (striking consents of PreCOIs where plaintiffs’ counsel failed 
to seek authorization to notify the putative class). 
 62. Whalen v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 380, 384 n.2 (2009). 
 63. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259; Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 914, 
925 (D. Ariz. 2010) (stating in dicta that conditional certification “will permit 
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are significant: if a court adopts the approach in Whalen, a 
plaintiff would be required to amend the complaint every time 
a potential plaintiff seeks to join the suit, lest they be stricken 
from the collective action.64 
2. Solicitation of Potential Plaintiffs by Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
Whether plaintiffs’ counsel may solicit clients prior to con-
ditional certification depends upon one’s interpretation of the 
role of conditional certification in conferring party status. If 
§ 216(b) requires only the filing of the employees’ consent form 
to confer party plaintiff  status, solicitation of plaintiffs appears 
appropriate. But if a court must find that the proposed collec-
tive is similarly situated before plaintiffs may join the suit, so-
licitation of potential plaintiffs would undermine the central 
role of conditional certification in the notice process.65 This was 
the approach adopted by the court in Chemi, arguing that 
“[o]utside the context of a notice process supervised by the 
Court, plaintiffs’ attorneys are not permitted unilaterally to 
send unsolicited notices.”66 Some courts take a more moderate 
approach, refusing to impose a blanket prohibition of solicita-
tion given the lack of a statutory prohibition of such activity.67 
At the other end of the spectrum are courts that allow virtually 
all forms of solicitation, including solicitations to an uncertified 
collective, either on First Amendment grounds68 or based on the 
court’s ability to correct any misleading communications at the 
 
potential class members to opt-into the lawsuit”); Letter Order, supra note 1, 
at 18. 
 64. Whalen, 85 Fed Cl. at 384 n.2; Letter Order, supra note 1, at 18. 
 65. Bouder v. Prudential Fin., Inc., No. 06-CV-4359, 2007 WL 3396303, at 
*2 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2007); Letter Order, supra note 1, at 18 (holding that by 
moving for conditional certification and soliciting clients on their own, plain-
tiffs were trying to “have their cake and eat it too”). 
 66. Letter Order, supra note 1, at 17. 
 67. See, e.g., Wertheim v. Arizona, No. Civ. 92–453 PHX RCB, 1993 WL 
603552, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 1993) (“There is no express statutory re-
quirement that consents may only be filed after the court authorizes no-
tice . . . . [T]he court is reluctant to conclude that section 256(a) per se forbids 
the filing of consents until after the court authorizes notice.”).  
 68. See, e.g., Gordon v. Kaleida Health, 737 F. Supp. 2d 91, 95–96, 101 
(W.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting First Amendment implications of barring plaintiffs’ 
counsel from contact with prospective collective action members). But see 
Maddox v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 
2007) (holding that prohibiting plaintiffs’ counsel from soliciting potential 
plaintiffs did not violate the First Amendment so long as the court has good 
cause and is sensitive to First Amendment concerns). 
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court-approved notice stage.69 Regardless of the justification re-
lied upon by the court, courts that view conditional certification 
as a prerequisite to commencing a collective action are more 
likely to place greater restrictions on precertification solicita-
tion.70 By defining the role of conditional certification in deter-
mining the status of PreCOIs, this Note hopes to resolve this 
inconsistency. 
3. Participation in Discovery by PreCOIs 
Traditionally, opt-in plaintiffs have not needed to partici-
pate in discovery prior to conditional certification, given the le-
nient evidentiary standard that generally requires only a 
“modest factual showing.”71 With the explosion of wage and 
hour litigation over the past decade,72 however, many courts are 
applying a stricter standard, and more extensive discovery is 
typically conducted prior to conditional certification.73 
Because greater discovery is being conducted at this stage, 
disputes often arise over whether PreCOIs should be required 
to participate in discovery before plaintiffs may move for condi-
tional certification.74 Where PreCOIs are viewed as having full 
 
 69. See Rubery v. Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 431, 435 
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Moreover, the Letter Notice’s inaccuracies can be remedied 
by the issuance of a corrective notice in the event class certification is granted.”). 
 70. See Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (noting the relationship between initial certification and notice). 
 71. See Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating 
that plaintiffs must make a “modest factual showing”); Cameron-Grant v. 
Maxim Healthcare Servs., 347 F.3d 1240, 1243 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that a court’s initial determination is made on the basis of “minimal evi-
dence”); Betancourt v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., No. 10C4763, 2011 WL 
1548964, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2011) (employing the “modest factual show-
ing” framework). 
 72. Ruan, supra note 20, at 735 (documenting more than a four-fold in-
crease in the number of FLSA cases filed in federal courts between 1997 and 
2007). This trend appears to be continuing, as the number of FLSA lawsuits 
filed in federal court rose ten percent in 2010, and this increase was expected 
to continue in 2011. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS AC-
TION LITIGATION REPORT: 2011 EDITION, at 3, 5 (2011). 
 73. See Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., No. 09-00042 ADM/RLE, 2009 WL 
3103852, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 23, 2009) (applying a heightened standard to 
protect employers from “the expense and effort of [sending] notice to a condi-
tionally certified class of claimants”).  
 74. Cf. Ruan, supra note 20, at 745 (“While full discovery into liability and 
damages is not required, some discovery typically must occur. Minimal discov-
ery [of PreCOIS] is needed because courts rely upon allegations supported by 
employee declarations or affidavits, in addition to the compliant to determine 
whether plaintiffs and potential opt-ins are similarly situated.”). 
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party status, courts are more likely to compel discovery. In 
Green v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., the defendant served 
notices of depositions on seven PreCOIs.75 The court rejected 
plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order preventing defendants 
from deposing four of the opt-in plaintiffs, arguing that defend-
ant was entitled to conduct discovery “so that it may at least 
test the veracity of plaintiffs’ mere allegation that they are sim-
ilarly situated victims of a common decision, policy, or plan.”76 
Compare that to Purnamasadi v. Ichiban Japanese Restau-
rant, where the court placed the entire evidentiary burden on 
the named plaintiffs prior to conditional certification, holding 
that at this stage, the burden is upon the named plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that they are similarly situated to other employ-
ees, thereby establishing “the right of the plaintiffs to establish 
a collective action,” and thereby allow each party to “conduct[] 
discovery concerning the opt-in plaintiffs.”77 
The court’s reasoning in each case demonstrates that these 
conflicting opinions reflect divergent views of the status of 
PreCOIs. When PreCOIs are viewed as party plaintiffs, as in 
Green Harbor Tools, it appears reasonable to compel them to 
submit to depositions before considering a motion for condi-
tional certification. But when full party status exists only for 
the named plaintiffs, as in Ichiban, compelling discovery ap-
pears inappropriate. 
Whether defendants may demand that PreCOIs be deposed 
prior to conditional certification has two important implica-
tions. First, PreCOIs who fail to respond to these requests are 
likely to be struck from the suit—compelling discovery of 
PreCOIs is one way defendants can reduce the size of the plain-
tiff collective.78 Second, deposing PreCOIs will almost certainly 
delay conditional certification, which may reduce the ability of 
 
 75. Green v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 09-2380-JAR, 2010 WL 
686263, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 2010). 
 76. Id. at *1–2 (emphasis added). 
 77. Purnamasidi v. Ichiban Japanese Rest., No. 10cv1549 (DMC)(JAD), 
2010 WL 3825707, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2010) (quotation omitted). 
 78. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(vi) authorizes courts to 
render a default judgment against a party who fails to appear for a deposition. 
See In re Am. Family Mut. Ins. Overtime Pay Litig., No. 06-cv-17430-WYD-
CBS, 2009 WL 1120293, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2009) (dismissing four opt-in 
plaintiffs for failing to appear to scheduled depositions).  
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PostCOIs to recover, since an individual’s FLSA claims are not 
tolled until a consent form is filed.79 
4. PreCOIs and the Tolling of the Statute of Limitations 
Period 
The explicit statutory language of § 256(b) states that an 
opt-in plaintiff ’s FLSA claims do not toll until consent is filed 
with the court.80 However, courts have failed to reconcile this 
language with the judge-made certification process, which did 
not exist, and was not contemplated, when the Portal-to-Portal 
Act was passed.81 
Courts continue to strictly enforce the tolling requirements 
of § 256, but have added a procedural process which precedes 
the mailing of notice and that often eats up one to two years82 of 
the FLSA’s two year statute of limitations period.83 Procedural 
rules and decisions that delay conditional certification may 
weaken employees’ ability to assert their statutory rights.84 If 
the conditional certification process is viewed as a statutory 
prerequisite for potential plaintiffs to opt in, courts may need to 
be more lenient in equitably tolling the statute of limitations 
for PostCOIs, especially where the defendants are largely re-
sponsible for delaying the certification process.85 
5. PreCOIs and Preclusion 
Whether PreCOIs are bound by decisions occurring prior to 
conditional certification, and thus precluded from bringing a 
 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 256(b) (2006); Becker & Strauss, supra note 18, at 1330, 
1333–38. 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 256. 
 81. See Gates, supra note 38 (discussing Congress’s failure to anticipate 
the development of a judge-made procedural framework following enactment 
of the Portal to Portal Act). 
 82. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 83. The FLSA’s two-year statute of limitations period is extended to three 
years in the event of a willful violation. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 
 84. Becker & Strauss, supra note 18, at 1330–32 (arguing that where de-
fendants are able to delay facilitating notice, damage awards are typically low, 
and the statute fails to deter employers from violating minimum wage and 
overtime laws). 
 85. Cf. Ewer v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 396, 402 (2005) (“Plaintiffs cor-
rectly note that the FLSA limitations period is not a statute of repose; thus, 
principles of equitable tolling apply.”). Courts have generally only applied the 
doctrine of equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances. E.g., Cranney v. 
Carriage Servs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108–09 (D. Nev. 2008) (“The doc-
trine of equitable tolling only applies in rare situations.”). 
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similar suit, hinges on the party status of PreCOIs. The preclu-
sion doctrine is intended to “preclude parties from contesting 
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate . . . .”86 Claim preclusion may generally only be applied 
against a party to the original suit, although preclusion may al-
so be asserted against a party who was adequately represented 
in the initial action.87 Inappropriately applied preclusion may 
undermine a party’s due process rights by denying them their 
“day in court.”88 Rule 23 class actions protect the rights of ab-
sent parties by requiring: (1) adequate representation by the 
named plaintiffs; (2) notice of the action; and (3) the opportuni-
ty to opt out.89  
The notice certification process that has evolved under 
FLSA case law is designed to satisfy these three require-
ments.90 Consent and notice are satisfied because “[i]n a 
§ 216(b) action, no one is bound by the judgment unless they 
opt in.”91 Conditional certification is designed to ensure that all 
parties are adequately represented, because “the ‘similarly sit-
uated’ test will ensure that all parties are properly joined in the 
same action.”92  
Issues of preclusion may arise should a dispositive motion 
be granted before a collective action has been conditionally cer-
 
 86. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). 
 87. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–95 (2008). 
 88. See Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedur-
al Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representa-
tion Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1877 (2009) (“The notion that the 
individual litigant possesses a foundational constitutional right to his day in 
court before his rights may be judicially altered has long served as a guide for 
the shaping of modern procedure.”).  
 89. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 900–01 (stating that nonparty preclusion in 
the class action context requires adequate representation by a knowingly rep-
resentative party with aligned interests); Mendez v. Radec Corp., 260 F.R.D. 
38, 47 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“‘[D]ue process requires at a minimum’ that putative 
class members be given notice of the class action and an opportunity to ex-
clude themselves from the class prior to any judgment being rendered which 
might affect their rights.” (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 812 (1985))). 
 90. Cf. Fraser, supra note 10, at 117 (“Rule 23 promotes judicial economy 
and protects parties’ rights, and these goals are equally relevant in § 216(b) 
actions.”). 
 91. Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D. Nev. 
1999). 
 92. Id. (“The § 216(b) requirement that plaintiffs consent to the suit 
serves essentially the same due process concerns that certification serves in a 
Rule 23 action.”). 
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tified.93 Should PreCOIs attempt to later bring the same claim 
in a later suit, the question becomes whether they are preclud-
ed from bringing the suit based on their participation as 
PreCOIs in the earlier action. The question turns on the status 
of PreCOIs, as whether a plaintiff is precluded from bringing a 
suit because of an earlier, similar suit, turns on whether they 
were a “party” to the original action.94 If filing a consent form 
confers full party status, PreCOIs would likely be precluded 
from bringing the future suit.95  
While few cases have tackled this question in the FLSA 
context, the two cases to decide related issues have split, based 
on each court’s interpretation of when opt-in plaintiffs become 
parties to the suit. In McElmurry v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 
the Ninth Circuit relied upon the language of § 216(b) to state, 
in dicta, that filing a consent form conferred party plaintiff  sta-
tus, and thus opt-in plaintiffs are precluded from bringing a 
subsequent suit.96 The Eastern District of Virginia reached the 
opposite conclusion in Adams v. School Board of Hanover 
County, allowing PreCOIs to withdraw from the suit without 
prejudice despite adverse rulings in the case, given that they 
were not parties to the suit before conditional certification was 
granted.97 
This Section has demonstrated that case law regarding a 
number of procedural issues that arise prior to conditional cer-
 
 93. For a discussion of the use of preclusion in collective litigation, see 
Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: Representation, Due Process, and Preclu-
sion in Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1082–96, 1118–25. 
 94. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898–99. However, preclusion would not be ap-
plied if the decision were either a denial of a conditional certification motion or 
the grant of a decertification motion; in each case the court would dismiss the 
claims of opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, granting them leave to file their 
claims on an individual, not collective, basis. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1 
(“[S]ome courts, when deciding on final certification, also have weighed the 
putative benefits of proceeding as a collective action against allowing individ-
ual suits to proceed . . . . If final certification is not granted, the court decerti-
fies the class, dismisses the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, and permits 
any remaining individuals to proceed to trial.”). 
 95. For the assertion that an opted-in plaintiff would be later precluded 
because of the change in party status, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1 
(“[E]very plaintiff who opts in to a collective action has party status . . . [O]nly 
those plaintiffs who have opted in are bound by the results of the litigation.”). 
 96. McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 
2007) (arguing, in dicta, that “plaintiffs who expressly join the collective action 
are bound by its results”). 
 97. Adams v. Sch. Bd., No. 3:05CV310, 2008 WL 5070454, at *17–19 (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 26, 2008). 
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tification is inconsistent. This inconsistency may impact the 
ability of plaintiffs to join the suit and to recover. Judicial econ-
omy is also impacted, as rulings on these issues may delay con-
ditional certification and ultimately the resolution of the case. 
Finality is also implicated by the uncertain status of PreCOIs. 
While each procedural issue is unique, Part II.A demonstrates 
that they share one common feature—each issue could be re-
solved more easily with a clear statutory interpretation of the 
status of PreCOIs. 
B. POTENTIAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS RESOLVING 
PROCEDURAL UNCERTAINTY PRIOR TO CONDITIONAL 
CERTIFICATION 
This Section analyzes the statutes that shape FLSA collec-
tive actions, and advances three possible interpretations to re-
solve the procedural uncertainty surrounding PreCOIs. To pro-
vide this resolution, each interpretation must address three 
basic procedural questions: (1) when potential plaintiffs may 
opt into an FLSA suit; (2) whether they can enter the suit as 
opt-in plaintiffs, or if the complaint must be amended to add 
these plaintiffs as named plaintiffs; and (3) when they become 
party plaintiffs, and are thereafter bound by the outcome of the 
case. 
1. Potential Interpretations of FLSA Statutory Language 
At first glance, the second sentence of § 216(b) clearly de-
fines the status of PreCOIs by stating that “[n]o employee shall 
be a party plaintiff . . . unless he gives his consent in writ-
ing . . . .”98 This can be read to mean that filing a consent form 
confers party plaintiff status. Indeed, several courts have 
reached this very conclusion.99 However, this can be interpreted 
as a necessary but not sufficient condition.100 Another necessary 
condition may be contained in the prior sentence, allowing an 
action to be brought on behalf of similarly situated employees. 
 
 98. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 99. E.g., Kaiser v. At The Beach, Inc., No. 08-CV-586-TCK-FHM, 2009 WL 
4506152, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 24, 2009) (“With this statutory procedure in 
place [filing the consent form], Plaintiffs were not required to seek formal 
amendment . . . to add opt-in plaintiffs.”); Barefield v. Rob Noojin Roofing, Inc., 
No. 8:07-cv-1610-T-27TBM, 2009 WL 51278, at *5 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2009) 
(“[Opt-in plaintiff ] was a party-plaintiff upon the filing of his consent-to-join.”). 
 100. Cf. Jordan Steiker, United States: Roper v. Simmons, 4 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 163, 166–67 (2006) (articulating the concept of a necessary but not 
sufficient condition in the context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
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Thus another interpretation could hold that to gain full party 
status: (1) an employee must be similarly situated; and (2) the 
employee must file their consent with the court. Many courts 
have interpreted § 216(b) as imposing these two requirements 
upon potential plaintiffs.101 
Section 256 is also relevant, stating that “in the case of a 
collective or class action,” the lawsuit “shall be considered to be 
commenced in the case of any individual claimant [not named 
in the complaint] . . . on the subsequent date on which such 
written consent is filed . . . .”102 However, the general applicabil-
ity of § 256 may be limited by its opening sentence, stating that 
the section is to be used “[i]n determining when an action is 
commenced for the purposes of section 255,” which governs the 
statute of limitations period.103  
Even if § 256 is interpreted as applying to contexts other 
than the tolling of the statute of limitations, an alternative in-
terpretation is possible. The phrase “[i]n the case of a class or 
collective action” can be read as creating a condition precedent 
to joining the suit.104 This reading permits three additional in-
terpretations. First, it could be interpreted to mean that the 
date the consent form is filed becomes the date on which the 
opt-in plaintiff ’s action commenced if and only if conditional 
certification is eventually (or already has been) granted. Se-
cond, it could be seen as a requirement that the action be condi-
tionally certified before a consent form may be filed. Under this 
interpretation, to join the action prior to conditional certifica-
tion, the complaint would have to be amended to add potential 
 
 101. E.g., Pereira v. Foot Locker, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 60, 62 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(“Pursuant to the FLSA, there are two requirements for potential plaintiffs to 
be included in the collective action: plaintiffs must (1) be ‘similarly situated’ 
and (2) give written consent.”). But see Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 
555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that conditional certification is not a pre-
requisite for opt-in plaintiffs to join a suit “so long as such plaintiffs are ‘simi-
larly situated’ to the named individual plaintiff,” and therefore “‘certification’ 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a representative action 
under FLSA”). This argument, made in dicta, begs the question of how plain-
tiffs can be required to be “similarly situated” as a condition for joining the ac-
tion if conditional certification isn’t a prerequisite for joining the action. 
 102. 29 U.S.C. § 256. 
 103. Id. §§ 255–56. There is case law supporting the application of § 256 to 
contexts other than the statute of limitations. See Kaiser, 2009 WL 4506152, 
at *6 (using § 256(b) to argue that opt-in plaintiffs join the suit when their 
consent form is filed); Adams v. Sch. Bd., No. 3:05CV310, 2008 WL 5070454, 
at *17–18 (E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2008) (citing § 256 to argue that an opt-in plain-
tiff becomes a party plaintiff upon filing a consent form). 
 104. 29 U.S.C. § 256. 
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plaintiffs as named plaintiffs.105 Finally, it could be used to 
support the idea that an action becomes a collective action 
when additional plaintiffs file consent forms to join the suit. 
Having hashed out different readings of Sections 216 and 
256, three viable interpretations emerge. Under the first inter-
pretation, potential plaintiffs may join the suit at any time, and 
become party plaintiffs by filing a consent form regardless of 
whether conditional certification is granted.  
Under the second interpretation, § 216(b) requires that 
opt-in plaintiffs file a consent form and be judicially certified as 
“similarly situated” to become party plaintiffs. Thus, under the 
second interpretation, potential plaintiffs may not join the suit 
until conditional certification is granted unless the complaint is 
amended to add them as named plaintiffs.  
Under the third interpretation, becoming a party plaintiff 
requires a consent form to be filed, and a judicial determination 
that the opt-in plaintiffs are “similarly situated.” Under the 
third interpretation, potential plaintiffs may file their consent 
forms any time after the suit is filed, but are merely conditional 
plaintiffs until the collective action is conditionally certified. 
Until this occurs, these PreCOIs are not parties to the suit and 
are not bound by the outcome. Having identified three possible 
readings of the statute, each of which would resolve the proce-
dural questions that are currently unsettled, Part III seeks to 
identify the superior interpretation. 
III.  IDENTIFYING THE SUPERIOR INTERPRETATION TO 
RESOLVE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING 
PRECOIS   
Having determined the potentially viable interpretations, 
the next task will be to identify the best interpretation. Four 
criteria will be used to aid in this determination: (1) whether 
the interpretation is consistent with statutory language and 
legislative history; (2) whether it finds support within case law; 
(3) how it fits within the existing procedural framework of the 
FLSA; and (4) what implications the interpretation would have 
for the procedural issues previously identified, and for public 
policy as a whole.106 The first criterion must be met to some de-
gree for the interpretation to be employed by courts and upheld 
 
 105. See Whalen v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 380, 384 n.2 (2009) (requir-
ing plaintiffs to amend their complaint and add additional party plaintiffs for 
opt-in plaintiffs to join the suit prior to conditional certification). 
 106. See supra Part II.A. 
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upon review.107 Given the role that influential cases have 
played in shaping the certification process, the second criterion 
must be satisfied for an interpretation to be adopted by district 
courts.108 The third criterion must be satisfied for the interpre-
tation to function effectively in practice.109 Assuming that the 
first three criteria are satisfied, the fourth criterion will identi-
fy the superior interpretation.110 
A. THE FIRST INTERPRETATION: PLAINTIFFS OPT IN AT ANY 
TIME AND IMMEDIATELY HAVE PARTY STATUS 
The first interpretation allows potential plaintiffs to join 
the suit at any time, and gain full party status by filing a con-
sent form, regardless of whether certification is granted. This 
interpretation, while acknowledging § 216(b)’s “similarly situ-
ated” requirement, would view it as grounds to later remove 
the plaintiffs from the suit, not as a prerequisite for party sta-
tus. To the extent that § 256 is read as requiring the suit to be 
a collective action for opt-in plaintiffs to join, courts would hold 
that the action becomes a collective action when the action is 
filed, and one additional plaintiff has opted in by filing a con-
sent form. 
1. Consistency with Statutory Language and Legislative 
History 
This approach has the advantage of being most consistent 
with Congressional intent when the Portal-to-Portal Act was 
enacted. The first interpretation satisfies two of the primary 
goals of Congress in passing the Act: to require plaintiffs to join 
 
 107. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–73 (1989) 
(granting courts the authority to create procedural devices so long as they are 
not contrary to statutory provisions while authorizing court involvement in 
providing notice to potential plaintiffs because it is consistent with Congres-
sional intent in implementing the Portal-to-Portal Act). 
 108. A January 25, 2012 Westlaw search for federal case citations to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s influential 2008 opinion in Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, 
Inc. revealed that the decision has been cited by six circuits outside the Elev-
enth Circuit and has been cited by federal district courts in thirty different 
states and the District of Columbia. Westlaw search on January 25, 2012 of 
“ALLFEDS” database using term: [“Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores”] and 
cross-checking with case citation 551 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 109. See supra Part I. 
 110. Cf. Becker & Strauss, supra note 18, at 1346 (noting the great im-
portance of the public policy goals of the FLSA). 
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the suit early in the action and to be bound by its result upon 
joining the action.111 
It could be argued that this interpretation fails to give ade-
quate weight to the similarly situated requirement by allowing 
employees to join the suit and be bound absent a finding that 
they are similarly situated. This argument ignores the fact that 
unlike the requirement for consent, § 216(b) does not clearly 
state that being similarly situated is a prerequisite for being 
considered a party plaintiff.112 The first interpretation does not 
ignore the “similarly situated” requirement, it simply refuses to 
read the requirement as creating a prerequisite to joining the 
suit.113 So long as conditional certification remains standard 
practice and occurs early in the course of litigation, Congres-
sional intent is honored. 
2. Support Within Existing Case Law 
The first interpretation is consistent with the line of cases 
that have interpreted § 216(b) and § 256(b) to mean that an 
opt-in becomes a party plaintiff once consent has been filed.114 
Wright, Miller & Kane’s Federal Practice and Procedure states 
that “every plaintiff who opts in to a collective action has party 
status,” and thus is “bound by the results of the litigation.”115 
Yet these sources either do not address the distinction between 
PreCOIs and those who opt in after conditional certification is 
granted, or simply presume that the consent forms were sub-
mitted after notice was sent pursuant to conditional certifica-
tion of the collective action.116 
Further support for this interpretation can be found among 
cases which require plaintiffs to demonstrate interest among 
potential plaintiffs before the court will conditionally certify the 
collective action.117 However, this approach is not widely fol-
 
 111. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 113. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra Part II.B. 
 115. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1; see also McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[U]nlike a class action, only those 
plaintiffs who expressly join the collective action are bound by its results.”). 
 116. See supra notes 114–15. 
 117. See, e.g., Dybach v. Fl. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567–68 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (“Before determining to exercise such power on application by 
Dybach upon remand of this case, the district court should satisfy itself that 
there are other employees of the department-employer who desire to ‘opt-in’ 
and who are ‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job requirements and 
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lowed.118 In other cases, while the failure to show additional in-
terested plaintiffs was not viewed as cause to reject conditional 
certification, the existence of employees who had already opted 
into the suit was used as evidence to support conditional certi-
fication of the collective.119  
Also supporting this interpretation are cases that have 
held that designation of a suit as a collective action occurs ei-
ther when the suit is commenced,120 or requires merely one em-
ployee to bring a claim on behalf of other employees, and an 
additional employee who opts into the action.121 While this in-
terpretation finds support within existing case law, by no 
means does it constitute the prevailing view. Not only do other 
circuits view a collective action to have commenced when it is 
conditionally certified, one can find contradictory holdings 
within the same circuits that earlier argued that a collective ac-
tion commences when a plaintiff opts into the suit.122 Overall, 
 
with regard to their pay provisions.”); Parker v. Rowland Express, Inc., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 1159, 1164–65 (D. Minn. 2007) (“[B]efore a conditional-certification 
motion may be granted, a named plaintiff (or plaintiffs) must proffer some evi-
dence that other similarly situated individuals desire to opt in to the litigation.”). 
 118. See McCaffrey v. Mortg. Sources, Corp., No. 08-2660-KHV, 2009 WL 
2778085, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2009) (explaining that only the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and a few district courts require a showing that other potential plaintiffs 
are interested in joining the suit). 
 119. See Hoffman v. Securitas Sec. Servs., No. CV07-502-S-EJL, 2008 WL 
5054664, at *5–10 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2008) (rejecting argument that plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that others seek to join the suit, while noting several argu-
ments that certification would be better supported were the class of potentially 
interested plaintiffs greater); Poreda v. Boise Cascade, LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 
234, 238–40 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that filing of twenty-four consent forms 
is sufficient to show that a class of similarly situated employees exists). 
 120. See Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (D. Nev. 
1999) (concluding “that an action is a collective action under § 216(b) where 
plaintiffs, on the face of their complaint, purport to sue on behalf of them-
selves and ‘others similarly situated’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006))). 
 121. See Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 
1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the right of the named plaintiff to represent 
other plaintiffs before any employee had opted into the suit because the action 
“does not become a ‘collective’ action unless other plaintiffs affirmatively opt 
into the class by giving written and filed consent”); Rollins v. Sys. Integration, 
Inc., No: 4:05-CV-408-Y, 2006 WL 3486781, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2006) 
(holding that plaintiffs purporting to bring action on behalf of similarly situ-
ated employees is insufficient; collective action designation requires an addi-
tional employee to opt into the suit). 
 122. See Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 
2008) (arguing that “the importance of certification, at the initial stage, is that 
it authorizes . . . notice of the action to similarly situated employees . . . . The 
key to starting the motors of a collective action is a showing that there is a 
similarly situated group of employees” (citations omitted)). 
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while case law can be found to support every element of the 
first interpretation, these cases tend to be anomalous and do 
not represent majority viewpoint. 
3. Compatibility With Existing Procedural Framework 
The first interpretation fits within the existing procedural 
framework for FLSA actions. It would not undermine, or alter 
in any fashion, the two-stage certification process that has be-
come the norm in FLSA collective actions.123 It would also allow 
potential plaintiffs to opt in prior to certification, thus facilitat-
ing the practice of those jurisdictions that require a showing of 
potential plaintiffs interested in joining the suit124 without forc-
ing the practice on those jurisdictions that do not.125 The only 
meaningful change would be for those jurisdictions that hold 
that plaintiffs must be found to be similarly situated in order to 
opt into the suit.126 Yet the procedural changes imposed upon 
those courts would not be great; they would simply file consent 
forms from opt-in plaintiffs throughout the action, a process 
that already occurs after conditional certification is granted.127 
4. Implications for Unresolved Procedural Issues and Public 
Policy 
The first interpretation implicates a number of FLSA pro-
cedural issues. First, it would bar opt-in plaintiffs from bring-
ing their own suit should an adverse judgment happen in the 
original suit.128 This is somewhat troublesome. Application of 
claim preclusion should require more than consent on behalf of 
putative class members; also important is a finding that opt-in 
plaintiffs are adequately represented by the named plaintiffs.129 
Conditional certification satisfies this need.130 This assurance is 
 
 123. See Kristin M. Stastny, Note, Eleventh Circuit Treatment of Certifica-
tion of Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: A Remedial 
Statute Without a Remedy?, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2008). 
 124. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 125. See McCaffrey v. Mortg. Servs., Corp., No. 08-2660-KHV, 2009 WL 
2778085, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2009). 
 126. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 380, 384 n.2 (2009). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 129. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 130. Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D. Nev. 
1999); see also Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. 
Colo. 1990) (arguing that opt-in plaintiffs may not be aware of conflicts within 
the putative class prior to certification); Bassett, supra note 93, at 1090–92 
(discussing the role of class certification in ensuring adequacy of representation). 
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important in the FLSA context, where potential plaintiffs may 
feel obligated to join the action at a very early stage to toll the 
statute of limitations.131 Absent conditional certification, it is 
difficult to say that PreCOIs have had their day in court, the 
ideal underlying due process rights.132 
Second, by holding that PreCOIs are already parties to the 
suit, the first interpretation would permit, if not compel, 
PreCOIs to be deposed prior to conditional certification.133 How-
ever, where PreCOIs are seen as conditional plaintiffs, the bur-
den is upon the named plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are 
part of a similarly situated group of employees, and courts need 
not stay consideration of conditional certification to allow the 
defense to depose or conduct other discovery regarding other 
opt-in plaintiffs.134 The likely outcome would be what was ob-
served in Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, where conditional 
certification was granted twenty-two months after the com-
plaint was filed, largely because the court delayed deciding the 
motion until the defense had had an adequate opportunity to 
depose opt-in plaintiffs.135 Such delays significantly reduce, if 
not outright eliminate, the ability of opt-in plaintiffs to recov-
er.136 This would also have the effect of making delay the ideal 
strategy for defendants, a result that seems certain to have ru-
inous effects on judicial economy and the effectiveness of the 
statute.137  
Given the potential for delays, plaintiffs’ counsel would be 
forced at the beginning of the case to either proceed with only 
the named plaintiffs until conditional certification is granted or 
solicit as many opt-in plaintiffs as possible, knowing that this 
will likely undermine the value of the court-provided notice 
process. 
Third, the first interpretation fails to account for the role of 
the two-stage certification process in the adjudication of FLSA 
claims. While the process started as a “case management tool” 
 
 131. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 132. For a discussion of factors necessary to satisfy the day in court ideal 
underlying due process rights, see Redish & Katt, supra note 88, at 1877–78. 
 133. See Green v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 09-2380-JAR, 2010 
WL 686263, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Feb. 23, 2010). 
 134. See Purnamasidi v. Ichiban Japanese Rest., No. 10cv1549 
(DMC)(JAD), 2010 WL 3825707, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2010). 
 135. See Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1241–43 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
 136. See Becker & Strauss, supra note 18, at 1330–31. 
 137. See id. 
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authorized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffmann-La 
Roche,138 it has become the framework through which repre-
sentative actions under the FLSA are understood.139 Beyond 
merely facilitating the provision of notice, conditional certifica-
tion is used to effectuate many of the values found in the class 
action device such as protecting potential plaintiffs’ due process 
rights,140 while preserving the court’s resources and protecting 
defendants by ensuring that adjudication of common questions 
can fairly determine defendant’s liability for the claims of the 
collective.141 If the two-stage certification process is to preserve 
these values, we must view it as more than just a case man-
agement tool, as it would function under the first interpreta-
tion, and instead infuse the certification process with statutory 
significance and impart upon each stage the procedural signifi-
cance to effectuate those values. 
B. THE SECOND INTERPRETATION: CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION 
IS REQUIRED FOR OPT-IN PLAINTIFFS TO BECOME PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS—PLAINTIFFS MAY ONLY JOIN ACTION PRIOR TO THIS 
STAGE THROUGH AMENDMENT TO ADD THEM AS NAMED 
PLAINTIFFS 
The second interpretation reads § 216(b) as creating two 
prerequisites before potential plaintiffs may join the suit—
filing a consent form and being similarly situated to the named 
plaintiff(s). The second interpretation would therefore require 
the court to grant conditional certification, thereby certifying 
that potential plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named 
plaintiffs, before potential plaintiffs could join the suit. 
1. Consistency with Statutory Language and Legislative 
History 
One criticism that can be levied against the second inter-
pretation is that by codifying the significance of conditional cer-
tification, it effectively converts the FLSA procedural mecha-
nism into a class device that was never authorized by statute, 
 
 138. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 174 (1989). 
 139. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 140. See Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 
1990) (arguing that the opt-in requirement does not absolve courts of the re-
sponsibility to protect the due process rights of opt-in plaintiffs). 
 141. See Fraser, supra note 10, at 117–19 (contending that the certification 
process should seek to preserve court resources and protect defendants’ rights 
through the commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23). 
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and in fact flies in the face of congressional intent in enacting 
the Portal-to-Portal Act.142 This argument ignores the fact that 
Congress was silent on the vast majority of procedural issues, 
delegating that work to the courts.143 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has held that § 216(b) was intended to facilitate 
multi-party suits while imposing an additional opt-in require-
ment.144 The second interpretation therefore remains faithful to 
the purpose of the statute by requiring plaintiffs to affirmative-
ly opt into the suit while making them bound by every decision 
of the court from the time they join the action.145 Furthermore, 
arguments regarding the lack of Congressional authorization 
for procedural mechanisms ignore the “considerable authority” 
granted to the courts by Rule 83 to impose procedural rules to 
manage multiparty suits,146 so long as the rules are “not other-
wise contrary to statutory commands.”147 
A second criticism is that the second interpretation exacer-
bates the tension between the conditional certification device 
and the statute of limitations. According to its terms, § 256 
provides potential plaintiffs two years to join the suit after it is 
filed.148 But under the second interpretation, potential plaintiffs 
may not join the suit until conditional certification, which pro-
vides them far less time to join the suit while shortening the 
statute of limitations in practice. Thus while the second inter-
pretation is consistent with the language of the statute, in 
practice it is somewhat at odds with legislative intent.149 
 
 142. See Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange Fiction: The “Class 
Certification” Decision in FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267, 268 
(2009) (arguing that while “the terms ‘conditional certification,’ ‘decertifica-
tion,’ ‘opt-in class action,’ and ‘conditional notice’ are ubiquitous” in FLSA 
suits, “none appears in the statute, the pertinent regulations, or any Supreme 
Court opinion regarding the FLSA”). 
 143. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170 (finding that § 216(b), by au-
thorizing collective actions without detailing procedural rules, grants courts 
“the requisite procedural authority” to promulgate procedural rules so long as 
they are “not otherwise contrary to statutory commands”). 
 144. See id. at 173. 
 145. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 146. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172–73. 
 147. Id. at 170 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83). 
 148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 256 (2006); see supra Part II.A.4. 
 149. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170 (noting that “through incor-
poration of § 216(b), . . . Congress has stated its policy that ADEA plaintiffs 
should have the opportunity to proceed collectively”). 
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2. Support Within Existing Case Law 
The second interpretation is consistent with three lines of 
cases. First, it is consistent with cases holding that opt-in 
plaintiffs become party plaintiffs and are bound by the action 
once they file consent forms with the court.150 The second inter-
pretation is also consistent with the line of cases holding that a 
collective action does not commence until the court has made a 
finding that a class of “similarly situated” employees exist by 
conditionally certifying the action.151 Finally, the second inter-
pretation is consistent with those courts that have rejected ef-
forts by plaintiffs’ counsel to contact potential plaintiffs prior to 
conditional certification.152 On the whole, therefore, the second 
interpretation finds much support within existing case law.  
However, the second interpretation represents a radical 
departure from existing case law in one important way. While 
the second interpretation is consistent with prevailing practice, 
it is in conflict with the nearly uniform view that the two-stage 
certification process is merely a case management tool, and its 
use is at the discretion of the district court.153 Like the third in-
terpretation, therefore, the second interpretation requires 
courts to acknowledge that the two-stage certification process 
has become accepted practice and should be viewed as an inte-
gral part of the procedural framework for FLSA cases. 
3. Compatibility with Existing Procedural Framework 
The second interpretation deviates from the existing pro-
cedural framework in two ways. First, the prohibition upon opt-
in plaintiffs joining the action until the action has been certi-
fied represents a major departure from existing case law. The 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims is the only jurisdiction that has 
explicitly held that plaintiffs must either join the case as 
 
 150. See Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 2010); Kaiser v. 
At The Beach, No. 08-CV-586-TCK-FHM, 2009 WL 4506152, at *6 (N.D. Okla. 
Nov. 24, 2009); see also Barefield v. Rob Noojin Roofing, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1610-
T-27TBM, 2009 WL 51278, at *5 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2009); WRIGHT, ET AL., 
supra note 1.  
 151. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
 152. See, e.g., Melendez Cintron v. Hershey P.R., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 10, 
17 (D.P.R. 2005); Letter Order, supra note 1, at 15–18. 
 153. Myers, 624 F.3d at 554–55; Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1260–61; Hipp v. Lib-
erty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2001); Mooney v. 
Aramco, 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003). 
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named plaintiffs prior or wait for the action to be conditionally 
certified.154 Not only would this represent a procedural change 
for most courts, it would also undermine the standard that 
many jurisdictions use at the conditional certification stage. 
The second interpretation is plainly incompatible with the re-
quirement imposed by the Eleventh Circuit and several district 
courts that plaintiffs must demonstrate interest in the suit 
from opt-in plaintiffs to grant conditional certification.155  
4. Implications for Unresolved Procedural Questions and 
Public Policy 
The second interpretation implicates several unresolved 
procedural questions. First, plaintiffs will be forced to choose to 
either amend the complaint to add potential plaintiffs or force 
the interested employees to wait until certification is granted. 
Neither option is particularly appealing. On the one hand, if 
opt-in plaintiffs are forced to wait until certification to join the 
suit, they face a major risk of having their claims precluded by 
the statute of limitations, given the two year statute of limita-
tions period.156 Plaintiffs may also need to add additional 
named plaintiffs to demonstrate interest in the suit, as re-
quired by some jurisdictions, such as the court in Wombles, be-
fore conditional certification will be granted.157  
Yet having to amend the complaint to add all potential 
plaintiffs as named plaintiffs creates its own set of procedural 
difficulties. Having to amend the complaint every time an opt-
in plaintiff seeks to join the suit would create an administrative 
burden upon both plaintiffs’ counsel and the court.158 Aside from 
the administrative burden, the second interpretation would al-
so force plaintiffs to overcome a new procedural hurdle—
satisfying the requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 
 
 154. Whalen v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 380, 384 n.2 (2009). 
 155. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 156. See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006). 
 157. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text (reviewing jurisdic-
tions requiring a demonstration that potential plaintiffs are interested in join-
ing the suit); see also Wombles v. Title Max of Ala., Inc., No. 303-CV-
1158CWO, 2005 WL 3312670, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2005). 
 158. Cf. Lucken Family Ltd. P’ship v. Ultra Res., Inc., No. 09-cv-01543-
REB-KMT, 2010 WL 2650037, at *2 (D. Colo. June 30, 2010) (arguing that 
joinder creates an excessive administrative burden where over one hundred 
plaintiffs seek to join the suit). 
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20.159 Many courts have found that the permissive joinder re-
quirement under Rule 20 is in fact more stringent than that 
imposed by conditional certification.160 The result would be to 
replace conditional certification with a series of Rule 20 mo-
tions every time plaintiffs attempt to add additional plaintiffs. 
Even if this were manageable for a small group of plaintiffs, it 
is widely recognized that joinder is impracticable for groups 
nearing one-hundred plaintiffs.161 
If joinder proves to be impracticable under the second in-
terpretation, there would be three likely effects. First, as men-
tioned earlier, many claims would be barred by the statute of 
limitations, or at the very least awards will be lessened so as to 
reducing the effectiveness of the FLSA and minimize its deter-
rent effect.162  
Second, because no potential plaintiffs may join the suit be-
fore conditional certification is granted without delaying the 
certification process (through the need to file an amended com-
plaint and satisfy Rule 20 joinder requirements), defendants 
would be further incentivized to delay conditional certification 
as much as possible.163 Indeed, by effectively making condition-
al certification become the sole means by which potential plain-
tiffs may join an action, the second interpretation would make 
delay the superior defense tactic in FLSA litigation. It is hard 
to imagine this being a positive development.  
Third, because of these complexities, to preserve their 
cause of action plaintiffs would be far more likely to bring suit 
on their own under the second interpretation. This would un-
dermine the entire purpose of representative actions in general 
and the FLSA collective device specifically—the consolidation 
of claims into one action for purposes of both efficiency and fi-
 
 159. To join new plaintiffs, it must be shown that the claim arises out of 
the same transaction or occurrence as the parties to the suit, while involving a 
common question of fact or law. FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
 160. See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 264 (D. 
Colo. 1990). 
 161. E.g., Lucken Family, 2010 WL 2650037, at *2 (“The classes include 
more than one hundred people, making joinder of the individual claims  
impracticable.”). 
 162. See Becker & Strauss, supra note 18, at 1330–32 (arguing that where 
defendants are able to delay sending notice, damage awards are typically low, 
and the statute no longer deters employers from violating the FLSA). 
 163. See id. at 1330–31 (outlining many ways that defendants may delay 
conditional certification). 
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nality.164 The potential downsides of the second interpretation 
seem too great to consider implementing it solely to address the 
need for a coherent doctrine regarding the party status of opt-in 
plaintiffs, especially when a superior interpretation exists. 
C. THE THIRD INTERPRETATION: ALLOW OPT-INS AT ANY TIME 
AS POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS YET REQUIRE CONDITIONAL 
CERTIFICATION TO CONFER PARTY PLAINTIFF STATUS 
The third interpretation differs from the second interpreta-
tion in that it would read § 256 as allowing employees to file 
their consent forms at any time; the date the consent is filed 
becomes the date their action was commenced if, and only if, 
the collective action is conditionally certified, i.e. “in the case of 
collective action.”165 Thus prior to certification, PreCOIs have a 
provisional status and would not be bound by the outcome of 
the case. 
1. Consistency with Statutory Language and Legislative 
History 
At first glance, the third interpretation adopts a somewhat 
strained reading of “in the case of collective action.” The phrase 
would appear to relate to the statute of limitations in collective 
actions, not make the certification of a collective a condition 
precedent for PreCOIs to gain party status.166 There is some va-
lidity to this criticism. On the other hand, this reading can be 
seen as effectuating the similarly situated requirement of 
§ 216(b) while preserving the meaning of § 256 by allowing 
plaintiffs’ suits to commence, for statute of limitations purpos-
es, on the date that written consent is filed with the court.167 In 
this sense, the third interpretation does the best job of integrat-
ing the language of the statute with the two-stage certification 
process. 
The third interpretation also appears to be inconsistent 
with the legislative history of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The par-
 
 164. The Supreme Court’s purpose in tolling the claims of all class mem-
bers in American Pipe was to prevent putative class members from filing du-
plicative suits to help preserve their right to recovery. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. 
v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974). Similarly, the collective action mechanism 
created by the Portal-to-Portal Act was aimed at reducing the number of suits 
that employers would face under the FLSA. See Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 
F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 165. 29 U.S.C. § 256 (2006). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. §§ 216(b), 256. 
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ty plaintiff  language in § 216 was inserted to bind any party 
who sought to benefit from the suit from the time they entered 
the suit.168 The third interpretation, on the other hand, would 
allow PreCOIs to join the suit without immediately being 
bound by the outcome.169 Despite this tension, the third inter-
pretation is consistent with legislative intent in enacting the 
Portal-to-Portal Act. Congress was concerned about the unfair-
ness of plaintiffs being able to sit on the sidelines until a posi-
tive outcome seemed likely.170 Such opportunism is not possible 
under the third interpretation. By submitting consent forms, 
PreCOIs will have already consented to being bound; their pro-
visional status stems from a statutory need to be similarly sit-
uated to the named plaintiffs, not an attempt to take a wait 
and see approach to the litigation. The third interpretation is 
also consistent in that it provides employers with notice early 
in the action of the potential number and size of the claims 
against them.171 The third interpretation in fact aids employers 
in this sense, by providing them with notice early in the action 
of the amount of employee participation they could face. Thus, 
while the third interpretation creates a condition to gaining 
party status not envisioned by Congress, this device is allowa-
ble under Rule 83, because it is not contrary to the statute itself 
or in direct conflict with Congressional intent.172  
2. Consistency with Existing Case Law 
While no court has explicitly identified PreCOIs as provi-
sional plaintiffs, or forwarded the statutory interpretation sup-
porting this view, the third interpretation fits well within exist-
ing case law. The third interpretation is consistent with case 
law requiring a finding that plaintiffs be similarly situated to 
become party plaintiffs.173 Similarly, it is consistent with the 
line of cases holding that a claim under the FLSA is not a col-
 
 168. See Linder, supra note 24, at 169, 173. 
 169. This would only be the group of opt-in plaintiffs this Note is address-
ing. Those who join after receiving notice of the suit following conditional cer-
tification, and subsequently file it with the court, would be bound by the result 
upon entering the suit. 
 170. See Linder, supra note 24, at 173. 
 171. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. For further discussion of 
Congressional motives in enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act, see supra notes 
26–30 and accompanying text. 
 172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83; see also supra notes 146–47 and accompanying 
text. 
 173. See supra notes 52–55, 91–92 and accompanying text. 
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lective action until it is conditionally certified.174 Finally, it 
gains implicit support from those cases that have treated opt-in 
plaintiffs as potential plaintiffs prior to certification, without 
necessarily intending this to describe their status in the case.175  
3. Consistency with Existing Procedural Framework 
The biggest divergence from the existing procedural 
framework is that the third interpretation is in direct conflict 
with cases holding that party status is conferred upon filing of 
the consent form. In theory, this is a vast departure, given that 
this is a common interpretation of § 216(b).176 Yet in practice, 
the difference is slight. The majority of instances when this ar-
gument is invoked occur after conditional certification has oc-
curred, at which point opt-in plaintiffs would become party 
plaintiffs when consent is filed.177 On the whole, while courts 
might reach different results on a number of issues under the 
third interpretation, the procedural framework itself would 
function much as it does now. 
4. Implications for Unresolved Procedural Issues and Public 
Policy 
The third interpretation would have several procedural 
implications. First, the third interpretation transforms condi-
tional certification from a case management tool, to be used at 
the court’s discretion, into a formalized device with statutory 
meaning.178 This may create some procedural complexity, as 
courts would have less flexibility in the certification process. 
However, this transition is not likely to be overly difficult, giv-
en that two-stage certification has become the norm.179 For ex-
ample, if sufficient discovery has taken place, courts will often 
 
 174. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
 175. See, e.g., Adams v. Sch. Bd., No. 3:05CV310, 2008 WL 5070454, at 
*17–18 (E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2008). 
 176. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-
sumption within this line of cases that conditional certification has already 
been granted). 
 178. This approach was best captured by the Second Circuit, which recent-
ly pointed out that “it is important to stress that the ‘certification’ we refer to 
here is only the district court’s exercise of the discretionary power, upheld in 
Hoffmann-La Roche to facilitate the sending of notice to potential class mem-
bers.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989)).  
 179. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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bypass the conditional certification process, and analyze a mo-
tion for conditional certification under the standard typically 
applied at the decertification stage.180 Yet these courts are im-
plicitly still using the two-stage certification process. Under the 
third interpretation, this additional discovery would most likely 
occur at a later stage of the litigation. 
This increased formality has advantages as well. The third 
interpretation provides a more complete understanding of the 
role of each stage of the certification process beyond mere case 
management issues. While the opt-in and statute of limitations 
provisions of the FLSA alter the due process concerns that need 
to be considered, they still exist. By viewing the second stage of 
certification as an ad hoc, case-by-case consideration of whether 
plaintiffs are similarly situated, we ignore the real purposes 
behind decertification, many of which can be understood 
through Rule 23.181 By formalizing these stages, we can better 
conceptualize the interests of each party that are protected at 
each stage of certification, and thereby develop a more cogent, 
and predictable, standard for certifying a collective action. 
There is neither a statutory requirement nor a Supreme 
Court mandate requiring courts to take an ad hoc, discretion-
ary approach to effectuate the collective action mechanism cre-
ated by Portal-to-Portal Act. As the Supreme Court made clear 
in Hoffmann-La Roche, courts have “the requisite procedural 
authority” to promulgate procedural rules so long as they are 
“not otherwise contrary to statutory commands.”182 While this 
authorizes discretionary use of certification as a case manage-
ment tool, it also allows courts to embrace the certification pro-
cess as a procedural framework, grounded in statutory lan-
guage, to provide consistent adjudication of procedural issues 
in a fashion that best promotes the remedial purposes of the 
FLSA.183 
 
 180. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 181. Considering the ways in which the decertification stage should mirror 
Rule 23 is beyond the purview of this Note. This Note points out that decertifi-
cation is no longer a mere case management tool—the standards that have 
evolved are meant to accomplish goals such as judicial efficiency while also 
protecting defendants against undue burden. Formalizing the two-stage certi-
fication process should provoke courts to understand how each stage of the 
certification process should work to accomplish these goals. 
 182. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. 
 183. See id. at 173 (“The broad remedial goal of the [FLSA] should be en-
forced to the full extent of its terms.”). 
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The third interpretation would not only allow employees to 
join the suit as provisional plaintiffs, it would encourage plain-
tiffs’ counsel to solicit employees prior to conditional certifica-
tion. One might object that plaintiffs’ counsel may provide mis-
leading information; this can easily be addressed once the 
action is conditionally certified. The court could, for example, 
require that all PreCOIs also submit the court-approved con-
sent form in the event that the original consent form did not 
contain disclosures the court feels are necessary. 
Allowing plaintiffs to join the suit immediately after it is 
filed as conditional plaintiffs, while also allowing solicitation of 
plaintiffs at this stage, best promotes “the broad remedial goal” 
of the FLSA.184 The certification process did not exist when 
Congress established a two-year statute of limitations period 
for FLSA claims.185 Restricting employees’ ability to join the 
suit prior to conditional certification is to effectively shorten the 
statutory limitations period. If conditional certification is 
granted over two years after the complaint is filed,186 employees 
may have lost entirely their right to recover.187 By giving the 
certification process statutory meaning, while acknowledging 
the impact that the device may have on the statutory rights of 
employees, the third interpretation best promotes the purposes 
of the statute, while preserving congressional intent in enact-
ing the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
The third interpretation would protect the due process 
rights of PreCOIs by requiring the collective action to be condi-
tionally certified before PreCOIs can be bound by a decision in 
the case. This recognizes that role conditional certification 
plays in ensuring that plaintiffs will be adequately represented 
by the named plaintiffs. One might object that this provides 
PreCOIs “another bite of the apple” should things begin to go 
awry. This ignores the role that stare decisis plays, and the 
strength with which it is applied, in cases where the preclusion 
doctrine cannot be applied.188 Unless the PreCOIs were not ac-
tually similarly situated to the named plaintiffs, stare decisis 
will likely make their second bite of the apple a bitter one.  
 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 186. See cases cited supra note 14. 
 187. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 
814 F.2d 358, 367 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (advocating rigid applica-
tion of stare decisis where former class members attempt to re-litigate a 
claim). 
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The third interpretation also provides adequate protection 
to defendants while promoting judicial economy. At the condi-
tional certification stage, the court’s finding should seek to de-
termine, without looking at the underlying merits, that plain-
tiffs have adequately identified a cause of action that 
purportedly exists among the plaintiffs, and a common legal or 
factual question that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiffs to 
relief. This lenient standard is appropriate. “The burden in this 
preliminary certification is light because the risk of error is in-
significant: should further discovery reveal that the named po-
sitions, or corresponding claims, are not substantially similar 
the defendants will challenge the certification.”189 By identify-
ing that the primary purpose of conditional certification is to 
preserve the due process rights of putative class members, 
while the primary purpose of decertification is to protect the 
rights of defendants, the third interpretation makes the time-
consuming practice of deposing PreCOIs unnecessary. 
  CONCLUSION   
Courts have failed to define the status of employees seek-
ing to opt into an FLSA collective action before conditional cer-
tification has been granted. While the certification process is 
designed to facilitate notice of the action to potential plaintiffs 
and allow them to join the action, this is not the exclusive 
mechanism by which potential plaintiffs can join a suit. In fact, 
there are very good reasons why potential plaintiffs should 
want to submit consent forms before conditional certification 
has been considered. A number of procedural questions often 
arise regarding such plaintiffs, referred to in this Note as 
PreCOIs, and the case law on these questions is wildly incon-
sistent. This Note argues that addressing this procedural un-
certainty requires a statutory definition of the exact status of 
PreCOIs in terms of when they can join the suit and what their 
legal status is prior to conditional certification. This Note offers 
an interpretation of statutory language under which employees 
may opt into the suit at any time after the complaint is filed, 
yet are only provisional plaintiffs until conditional certification 
is granted. This interpretation is consistent with the language 
of the statute, legislative history, existing case law, and the ex-
isting procedural framework for FLSA cases. Most importantly, 
 
 189. Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 08-cv-2317, 2009 WL 4723286, at *2 (M.D. 
Pa. Dec. 9, 2009). 
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it best promotes the purposes of the FLSA while protecting the 
statutory and constitutional rights of opt-in plaintiffs by allow-
ing them to preserve their right to recover without prematurely 
compromising their due process rights. 
